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IV 
JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 78A-4-103(2)(a) U.C.A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND THE STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issues 
1. Whether the District Court erred in its ruling that it (the trial court) 
lacked jurisdiction to hear the Petitioner's Complaint (Petition) filed with the trial 
court seeking a trial de novo with respect to the Department of Alcoholic Beverage 
Control's final order? 
2. Whether the District Court did deny Petitioner/Appellant their rights 
under Article 1, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution, Open Courts Provision in its 
ruling that the Commission's order, dated 29th of June 2007 was not a final order 
and therefore fell outside the administrative procedures act? 
3. Whether the District Court did deny Petitioners/Appellants their 
rights to due process under the Constitution of the United States, Amendment 14 
and Article 1 and Section 7 of the Utah State Constitution? 
Standard of Review 
The standard of review for issues number one of determining whether the district 
court did err when it dismissed Petitioner's appeal for trial de novo for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction is one in which the appellate court reviews the trial court's decision 
for correctness. Bourgeous v. State of Utah Dept. Comm., 41 P.3d 461, 463 (Ut. Ct. App. 
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2002); See also; Canfield v. Layton City, 122 P.3d 622, (2005). 
The standard of review for issues number two and three is the "correctness 
standard" as set forth in State ex rel. A.E., 29 P.3d 31 (2001) which the appellate court 
reviews the trial court's decision for correctness. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following statutes and constitutional provisions are determinative in this 
appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. §78-3-4; 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(a); 
Title 63, Chapter 46(b) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act; 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78A-4-103(2)(a); 
Utah State Constitution, Article 1, Section 11; 
Utah State Constitution, Article 1, Section 7; and 
United States Constitution, 14 Amendment. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
That on or about the 12 day of December, 2006, a Notice of Agency Action and 
of Informal Adjudication and Notice of Hearing was filed by Respondent in the above 
entitled action. (Record, page 80-82). That in the notice of agency action it was not 
alleged that Respondent, Division of Alcohol and Beverage Control (hereinafter also 
referred to as "DABC"), was seeking to revoke or suspend Petitioner's beer premise 
license. (Record, page 80-82). That on or about January 25, 2007, Petitioner/Appellant, 
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Rugby Pub, LLC, and Petitioner, Jerald Sarafolean, did file an answer to notice of agency 
action. (Record, page 86-88). That an informal hearing was held on or about January 31, 
2007. That findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommended action were issued on 
February 5, 2007. (Record, page 20-28). That the findings of fact, conclusions of law 
and recommended action were based on the hearing held January 31, 2007. That an order 
was issued by the commission on or about April 27, 2007, wherein it was found that 
Petitioner, Rugby Pub, LLC, was liable to pay administrative costs of $668.33 and fines 
and costs totaling $1,168.33. (Record, page 15, 16). That of the $1,168.33, Jerald 
Sarafolean was ordered to pay a $50.00 fine and Rugby Pub was ordered to pay a 
$450.00 fine and $668.33 administrative costs were assessed to Rugby Pub, LLC. 
(Record, page 15, 16). That in fact Jerald Sarafolean's brother, Thomas Sarafolean was 
the one that signed the application for a beer license and on the premise beer bond. 
(Record, page 31-33). That at no point in the administrative process was Thomas 
Sarafolean, the person responsible on the premise beer bond, ever named by Respondent, 
DABC, as a party or given notice of action against the bond. (Entire record; specifically, 
record, page 46 paragraph 1, Record page 18-29, Record, page 80-82). 
That Rugby Pub, LLC did close its doors on or about February 1, 2007 and did 
elect not to renew its license. That an order to show cause was filed on or about June 18, 
2007 seeking forfeiture of Petitioner's compliance bond and notice was given of a 
hearing on such order to show case which was set for June 29, 2007. (Record, page 13, 
14). That such notice was mailed on June 18, 2007 but arrived thereafter. (Record, page 
13, 14). That a hearing was held on June 29, 2007 in order to determine whether there 
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was grounds to forfeit Petitioners/Appellants' compliance bond. Record, page 61). 
Petitioners' attorney did object to such forfeiture based on the fact that Respondent had 
not followed proper procedure for forfeiture of the compliance bond. (Record, page 74, 
paragraph 8 of memorandum). That based on the proceedings from the hearing, a final 
order was entered by the Utah Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission on June 29, 2007 
wherein the compliance bond was ordered forfeited to cover fines and costs. (Record, 
page 61). That pursuant to such decision, Jerald Sarafolean's fine as an employee and 
individual was assessed against the bond posted by Petitioner, Rugby Pub. (Record, page 
61). That after the hearing on June 29, 2007, a letter was sent from the bond company to 
the State of Utah indicating that they had completed investigation of the claim against 
the beer bond. (Record, page 68, 69). That on or about July 27, 2007 a petition was 
filed seeking judicial review of the order entered on June 29, 2007. (Record, page 1, 2, 3). 
That on or about August 6, 2007, Respondent/Appellee did file an answer to petition for 
judicial review of order and ruling of the Utah alcoholic control commission and request 
for trial de novo. (Record, page 7-9). That on or about October 2, 2007, 
Respondent/Appellee did file motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction together with a 
memorandum in support thereof. (Record, page 44-70). That on or about October 2, 
2007, Petitioner/Appellant did file a motion for partial summary judgment together with a 
memorandum of points and authority in support thereof (Record, page 71-105). That 
Petitioner's motion for summary judgment was based on arguments that 
Respondent/Appellee had not followed proper procedure to attach the compliance bond. 
(Record, page 71-105). That on or about October 10, 2007, Petitioner/Appellant did file 
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a memorandum of points and authority in opposition to Respondent's motion to dismiss. 
(Record, page 106-144). That in such memorandum it was argued that the term "final 
order" was at issue and that the order dated June 29, 2007 provide the basis for the appeal 
for a trial de novo. (Record, page 106-113). 
That on or about the 15th day of October, 2007, Respondent/Appelle did file a 
memorandum in opposition to motion for partial summary judgment. (Record, page 144-
157). That on or about October 17, 2007, Petitioner/Appellant did file a reply to 
memorandum in opposition to motion for partial summary judgment. (Id. at 163-165). 
That on page 3 paragraph 2 of Petitioners' reply to memorandum in opposition to motion 
for summary judgment, Petitioners do state that "forfeiture of the [compliance] bond 
would affect the financial rights of persons or entities that were not given notice and an 
opportunity to be heard and which may have voiced an objection." (Id. 165). That on or 
about October 18, 2007, Respondent did file a request for hearing on pending dispositive 
motions. (Id. at 161). That a hearing was scheduled on or about October 29, 2007 for 
oral arguments on the dispositive motions. That at the hearing argument was presented 
by the attorney for Petitioners objecting to lack of notice prior to June, 2007 and 
objecting to lack of an opportunity to be heard on certain issues prior to June, 2007. (See 
trial court transcript page 11, paragraphs 19-25; page 13, paragraphs 6-10, 19-25; page 
14, paragraphs 1-8 and page 21, paragraphs 13-23 attached hereto and filed herewith as 
Exhibit "A"). That on or about November 1, 2007 Judge Iwasaki did issue a 
memorandum. (Id. at 171-174). According to the memorandum decision, the trial court 
ruled that the order to show cause filed on June 18, 2007 by the Division of Alcohol and 
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Beverage Control fell outside the administrative procedures act and could not be utilized 
to extend the time for appeal. Further, Judge Iwasaki did rule that it lacked jurisdiction to 
hear the matter and did grant Respondent's motion to dismiss. (Id.). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The appeal for trial de novo was appropriate and the district court did have 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Under Utah law, a party may appeal for a trial de novo 
any order constituting final agency action so long as the appeal is brought within thirty 
days of the order. Utah case law defines agency action negatively as 'the whole or a 
part' of any action which is not preliminary, preparatory, procedural, or intermediate with 
regard to a subsequent agency action of that agency or another agency. Under the test for 
final agency action and the facts of this case, it is clear that the June 29, 2007 order issued 
by the DABC commission was a final appealable order since the order was not 
preliminary or intermediate and the administrative decision making had reached a stage 
where judicial review would not disrupt the orderly process of adjudication, and rights 
and obligations were determined in the June 29, 2007 order, and there appeared to be no 
further agency action required or eminent. 
The district court did violate the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution 
found in Article I, Section 11 when it denied jurisdiction of the appeal for trial de novo. 
Clearly, Utah courts have recognized that the open courts provision and due process 
clause requires that litigants have their day in court and access to the court house. By 
narrowly construing the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, the district court did violate 
the open courts provision by barring Petitioners' statutory right to judicial review of a 
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decision affecting their person, property and or reputation. The open courts provision 
requires a liberal construction of statutes granting jurisdiction and the decision of the 
district court should be overruled. 
The due process clause of the Utah Constitution and the United States Constitution 
require that there be a procedural safeguard to administrative decisions. Prohibiting an 
appeal after an agency action would in essence be condoning every action taken by and 
administrative body after and initial order was entered. Due process mandates a judicial 
review before a party can be deprived of life, liberty or property. Any decision affecting 
a party's protected rights must be reviewable. 
Additionally, the due process clause requires notice of the action to all interested 
parties with sufficient time to prepare to meet or challenge such actions. Quite simply, in 
the underlying agency decision dated June 29, 2007 no prior notice was given to one 
interested party and Petitioners were given insufficient time to acquire necessary 
information to defend against the on premise beer bond forfeiture. Such actions on the 
part of the administrative agency were further compounded by the district court's 
decision denying jurisdiction. Due process requires more before rights are affected and 
the current case should be remanded for further judicial determination of the affected 
interests and the parties5 rights. 
ARGUMENT 
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I. THE ORDER ENTERED ON JUNE 29, 2007 BY THE COMMISSION OF 
ALCOHOL AND BEVERAGE CONTROL WAS A FINAL ORDER 
APPEALABLE UNDER UTAH LAW AND THE DISTRICT COURT DID ERR 
IN IT'S RULING TO DISMISS THE APPEAL FOR TRIAL DE NOVO FOR 
LACK OF JURISDICTION 
The appeal for trial de novo filed by Petitioner/Appellant was based on a final 
order and therefore the district court did have jurisdiction to hear the case. Utah code 
annotated, section 78-3-4 does govern whether this Court has jurisdiction for Petitioner's 
appeal. Section 78-3-4 of the Utah code provides in relevant part that courts "shall 
comply with the requirements of [UAPA], in its review of agency adjudicative 
proceedings." More specifically, 78-3-4(7) provides that "[t]he district court has 
jurisdiction to review: (a) agency adjudicative proceedings as set forth in title 63, chapter 
46b, Administrative Procedures Act, and shall comply with the requirements of that 
chapter, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings." Utah code section 63-46b-
14(3)(a) provides in relevant part that "[a] party shall file a petition for judicial review of 
agency action within 30 days after the date that the order constituting final agency action 
is issued or is considered to have been issued under Subsection 63-46b-13." Clearly, 
Utah law does provide for a 30 day time period in which to appeal for judicial review of 
agency action. 
According to the trail court's ruling, the order issued by the Division of Alcohol 
and Beverage Control Commission (hereinafter referred to also as "DABC") on April 27, 
2007 was the only final order from which Petitioner/Appellant could appeal and that the 
order entered on June 29, 2007 did not extend the date of the appeal. Despite the 
foregoing holding, it is Appellants' position that the district court did err in its ruling to 
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dismiss the case and that under Utah law, the order entered on June 29, 2007 was a final 
order from which Petitioners could appeal. As demonstrated in the facts above, 
following the hearing on Respondent's motion for order to show cause filed on June 18, 
2007, it was determined and ordered that there were grounds to forfeit the compliance 
bond posted for and on behalf of Petitioner, Rugby Pub, LLC. In essence, Petitioner did 
disagree with Respondent's ability to revoke the compliance bond. Further, Petitioners 
did believe that they had not been given sufficient notice of Respondent's intent to revoke 
the bond. Based on the DABC's decision to revoke the compliance bond, Petitioner filed 
an appeal for a trial de novo seeking judicial review of the June 29, 2007 order. Such 
appeal was done on July 27, 2007, clearly, less than thirty days from the final order 
issued by the Division of Alcohol and Beverage Control. Hence, the real issue before 
this Court is what "constitutes final agency action" for purposes of filing an appeal under 
the administrative procedures act. 
In the case of Barker v. Utah Public Service Commission, 970 P.2d 702, 705 
(1998) the Utah Supreme Court did recognize that "[t]he Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act does not specifically define 'final agency action.' However, it does say 
that an agency will contemplate reconsideration of an order only 'if the order would 
otherwise constitute final agency action'." The Come in Barker went on to state that "the 
Model State Administrative Procedure Act defines agency action negatively as 'the 
whole or a part' of any action which is not preliminary, preparatory, procedural, or 
intermediate with regard to a subsequent agency action of that agency or another 
agency." Id. at 706 Under the foregoing definition of final agency action, it is clear that 
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the order issued by DABC on April 27, 2007 was not final in that it was merely a 
preparatory or an intermediate order that required an order to show cause to determine 
whether the compliance bond could be forfeited. Thereafter, a hearing was held in which 
it was determined that the compliance bond could be forfeited. Petitioner disagreed with 
such decision and filed an appeal to the district court. 
In the case of Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 999 P.2d 
17, 21 (2000) the Utah Supreme Court stated that "the appropriate test to determine 
whether an agency action is final under Utah law includes three parts" (1) Has 
administrative decision making reached a stage where judicial review will not disrupt the 
orderly process of adjudication?; (2) Have rights or obligations been determined or will 
legal consequences flow from the agency action?; and (3) Is the agency action, in whole 
or in part, not preliminary, preparatory, procedural or intermediate with regard to 
subsequent agency action?" In applying the foregoing test to the facts of the current case 
it is easy to determine that the appeal by Petitioner was appropriate. First, the 
administrative decision making had reached a stage where judicial review would not 
disrupt the orderly process of adjudication. In other words, the appeal was not 
prematurely taken. Second, the agency action on April 27, 2007 was clearly preliminary, 
preparatory and intermediate in that a subsequent order to show cause was needed to 
determine whether Petitioner's compliance bond could be forfeited. Had the agency 
order of April 27, 2007 been the final order there would have been no need for an order 
to show cause and subsequent order. Nevertheless, there was a subsequent hearing and 
order which unequivocally demonstrate the intermediate and preparatory state of the 
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April 27, 2007 order. On page 7 of Respondent's memorandum in support of motion to 
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, paragraph 1, Respondent states that "[t]he 
Order to Show Cause to enforce the resulting order did not commence new adjudicative 
proceeding, it was simply a necessary step to complete the original." Obviously, 
Respondent admits that another step was needed to complete the original action. Third, 
the rights of the parties had not been completely determined in the April 27, 2007 order. 
The DABC itself represented that there was still the need for an action to forfeit the 
compliance bond. Accordingly, DABC filed a motion for order to show cause posing the 
question of the propriety of the bond forfeiture. In and by this action, DABC did 
represent that there was additional need for agency determination. Had the April 27, 
2007 order been final there would have absolutely been no need for a subsequent hearing 
or order. 
In conclusion, the appeal for trial de novo was filed within thirty days of the order 
constituting final agency action with regards to Petitioner, Rugby Pub, LLC's, compliance bond. 
Therefore, Petitioner did comply with Utah Code Section 78-3-4 and with title 63, chapter 46b, 
Administrative Procedures Act and the dismissal of such appeal on the part of the district court 
was done plainly in error. Such conclusion is in accordance with the publics need for a remedy 
to an agency decision and this Court should overrule the district court's ruling and remand the 
case for further determination. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DENIED PETITIONERS THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE 
OPEN COURTS PROVISION OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION BY RULING 
THAT THE ORDER OF THE DABC COMMISSION DATED JUNE 29, 2007 
WAS NOT A FINAL APPEALABLE ORDER 
The open courts provision of the Utah Constitution makes it clear that an 
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individual cannot be deprived of an effective remedy to protect his individual rights. 
Article 1, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution provides that "[a] 11 courts shall be open, 
and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall 
have remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered without denial or 
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before 
any tribunal in this State." In ruling on the open courts provision of the Utah 
Constitution, the Utah Supreme Court declared that "[a] plain reading of section 11 also 
establishes that the framers of the Constitution intended that an individual could not be 
arbitrarily deprived of effective remedies designed to protect basic individual rights. A 
constitutional guarantee of access to the courthouse was not intended by the founders to 
be an empty gesture; individuals are also entitled to a remedy by 'due course of law9 for 
injuries to 'person, property, or reputation'." Horton v. Goldminers Daughter, 785 P.2d 
1087,1091 (Utah 1989); Citing: Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d at 675. In 
addition to the foregoing declaration, the court in Horton recognized that the Utah open 
courts provision "specifically guarantees, among other things, "a remedy by 'due course 
of law' for injuries to 'person, property, or reputation.'" Id. 1093. Finally, the court in 
Horton held unconstitutional a statute of repose applicable to architects and builders 
thereby allowing a claim for relief to stand. 
Certainly, the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution has specific 
applications to the present case. This is particularly true where the district court's 
holding did narrowly construe the term "final order" thereby depriving Petitioners of their 
right to object to the order to show cause filed by the DABC and to voice objections to 
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the DABC Commission's order of forfeiture of the compliance bond. Quite simply, 
under the district court's present ruling, an administrative agency would be free to take 
any and all action against a person's property and rights without redress to the courts so 
long as such action was taken subsequent to an initial or first order. Clearly, this holding 
would lead to absurd abrogation of the rights of an individual to effective remedy. As 
applied to this case specifically, the decision of the district court did deprive Jerald 
Sarafolean and Rugby Pub, LLC of the right to contest the procedure used by the DABC 
to attach the bond and did deprive Jerald Sarafolean's brother, Thomas Sarafolean, of his 
right to object to attachment of the bond for which he was responsible. Thomas 
Sarafolean was not named in any of the documents filed by Respondent, DABC, was not 
formally made aware of the potential for liability and otherwise was never notified of the 
proceedings against him by Respondent, DABC. Further, Thomas Sarafolean was the one 
that signed the application for a beer license and the on premise beer bond. Hence, the 
district court's decision effectively deprived Thomas Sarafolean and Petitioners of 
redress on attachment of the compliance bond and left sole discretion of bond forfeiture 
to a commission created by DABC to hear and rule on their own disputes. The foregoing 
outcome could not possibly have been the intention of the legislature under the 
administrative procedures act nor the open courts provision of the Utah State 
Constitution. 
In the case of Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co.. 44 P.3d 663, 673 (Utah 2002) the 
Utah Supreme Court stated that "both the due process clause of article I, section 7 and the 
open courts provision of article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution guarantee that 
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litigants will have his 'day in court'." Additionally, in the case of Horton v. Goldminer's 
Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087, 1094 (1989), the Utah Supreme Court did recognize a two part 
test "to determine whether a statue that limits one's rights to remedy by due course of law 
for injury to one's 'person, property, or reputation' violates Article I, section 11: First, 
section 11 is satisfied if the law provides an injured person an effective and reasonable 
alternative remedy 'by due course of law' for vindication of his constitutional interest. 
. . . Second, if there is no substitute or alternative remedy provided, abrogation of the 
remedy or cause of action may be justified only if there is a clear social or economic evil 
to be eliminated and the elimination of an existing remedy is not an arbitrary or 
unreasonable means of achieving the objective." In this case there is no alternative 
remedy provided by law for disputing the commission's decision on attachment of the 
bond except raising the issue before the district court. The district court's narrow 
application of the administrative procedures act and narrow definition of the term "final 
agency action" left Petitioners and Thomas Sarafolean with no alternate remedy to 
challenge the commission's decision to forfeit their bond. Further, under the holding in 
Horton, when there is no alternative remedy, abrogation of the remedy or cause of action 
may be justified only if there is a clear social or economic evil to be eliminated and the 
elimination of an existing remedy is not arbitrary or unreasonable means of achieving the 
objective. In the present case, there does not appear to be a clear economic evil to be 
eliminated. At least under the facts of the present case, no clear economic evil was eluded 
to by Respondent or in the findings issued by Judge Iwasaki. Therefore, Judge Iwasaki's 
narrow interpretation of the administrative procedures act appears to violate the open 
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courts provision of the Utah Constitution by depriving Petitioners of a remedy at law to 
challenge the DABC commission's decision to forfeit the bond. 
Based on the foregoing authority and the facts of this case, Petitioners urge this 
Court to hold that Judge Iwasaki's interpretation of the administrative procedures act and 
interpretation of what constitutes "final action" be overruled under the Utah open courts 
provision and that this case be remanded for further hearing before the district court. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT DID DENY PETITIONERS/ 
APPELLANTS THEIR RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS UNDER THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, AMENDMENT 14, AND 
ARTICLE 1, SECTION 7 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION BY 
DISMISSING THEIR APPEAL. 
A. Due Process Requires the Opportunity for Judicial Review of an Administrative 
Decision. 
The district court's dismissal of Petitioners' appeal for trial de novo did violate 
their rights to due process. The right to due process of law is set forth in Article I, 
Section 7 of the Utah Constitution which provides that "[n]o person shall be deprived of 
life, liberty or property without due process of law." Also, the XIV Amendment to the 
United States Constitution provides in relevant part that "[n]o State shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law." In accordance with the foregoing provisions of the Utah and United States 
Constitution the Utah Supreme Court in Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 44 P.3d 663, 673-
674 (Utah 2002), has ruled that "[p]arties to a suit, subject to all valid claims and 
defenses, are constitutionally entitled to litigate any justiciable controversy between them 
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i.e., they are entitled to their day in court. Both the due process clause of article I, section 
7 and the open courts provision of article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution guarantee 
that litigants will have 'his day in court5." See also, Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d 796, 
799 (Utah 1998) ("even the most limited reading of [the open courts] provision 
guarantees a day in court to all parties . . . in disputed insurance claims). The Utah 
Supreme Court in Miller went on to state "[tjhis constitutional right to a day in court is 
the 'right and opportunity, in a judicial tribunal, to litigate a claim, seek relief, or defend 
one's rights'." Quoting; Blacks Law Dictionary 402 (7th ed. 1999). Additionally, the 
Utah Supreme Court in the case of Celebrity Club Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Com'n, 
657 P.2d 1293 (Utah 1982), recognized that "[njeither a court nor other judicial tribunal 
may deny a person a constitutional right or deprive such person of a vested interest in 
property without any opportunity to be heard. To do so constitutes taking of property 
without due process of law. Many attempts have been made to further define "due 
process" but they all resolve into the thought that a party shall have his day in court-that 
is each party shall have the right to a hearing before a competent court, with the privilege 
of being heard and introducing evidence to establish his cause or his defense, after which 
comes judgment upon the record thus made." The court in the Celebrity Club case held 
unconstitutional a statue which denied a business owner the right to appeal to the district 
court a decision involving its liquor license. 
The rulings set forth in the Miller and Celebrity Club cases clearly demonstrate 
that Utah law favors the opportunity to be heard before a judicial tribunal. Along the 
same lines as the holding in Miller and Celebrity Club, numerous court in other 
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jurisdictions have held that due process is satisfied where there is judicial review of 
administrative decisions. For example, the Colorado Court of Appeals in the case of 
Wecker v. TBL Excavating, Inc., 908 P.2d 1186 (Colo. App. 1995) held that "[judicial 
review of the decision of an administrative agency which affects substantial statutory 
rights is constitutionally required." The United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit stated that "[i]t is the law of this Circuit that a state provides adequate due process 
when it provides 'reasonable remedies to rectify a legal error by a local administrative 
body9." Bello v. Walker, 840 F.2d 1124, 1128 (3rd Cir. 1988). See also; John E.Long, 
Inc. v. Borough of Ringwood, 61 F. Supp.2d 273 (D.N.J. 1998) (holding State furnishes 
constitutionally adequate procedural due process when it provides reasonable remedies to 
correct legal error by local administrative body). The United State District Court for 
Pennsylvania in Rumph v. State Workmen's Ins. Fund, 964 F.Supp. 180? 188 (E.D. Pa. 
1997), recognized that "[a]n administrative appeal mechanism followed by judicial 
review is constitutionally sufficient." The Texas Court of Appeals in Texas Employment 
Com'n v. Remington York, 948 S.W.2d 352, 358 (Tex App. 1997), stated that "[t]here is 
no violation of due process if provision is made for a trial de novo in the district court on 
issue passed upon by an administrative board." Finally, article VIII, section 5 of the Utah 
Constitution, provides, in part, that "there shall be in all cases an appeal of right from the court of 
original jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause." 
As outlined herein, there is ample authority which would indicate that judicial 
review of an administrative agency is an essential element of the due process clause. 
Clearly, the facts of the present case indicate that the district court may have invoked 
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jurisdiction had it interpreted ' final agency action' to include action taken on the 
compliance bond. Petitioners maintain that such decision affected the property rights and 
obligations of themselves as well as Thomas Sarafolean an un-named third party listed on 
the compliance bond itself. Therefore, due process would dictate that judicial review of 
any decision affecting this bond is necessary. Further, article VIII, section 5 of the Utah 
Constitution specifically provides for an appeal right. For the reasons set forth herein, 
Petitioner's urge this Court to overrule the district court's decision denying jurisdiction 
over the appeal for trial de novo. 
B. Due Process Requires Notice and An Opportunity to be Heard in a Meaningful 
Manner By An Impartial Fact Finder. 
While it is recognized that an administrative agency may issue an order affecting 
the rights of individuals, such order must comply with due process and all parties must be 
given an opportunity to prepare and be heard. As set forth above in the 14th Amendment 
to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution, the law 
requires that no person be deprived of life, liberty, or property interest without due 
process of law. In ruling on the due process clause, the Utah Supreme Court has stated 
that "every significant deprivation, whether permanent or temporary, of an interest, which 
is qualified as 'property' under the due process clause must be preceded by notice and 
opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case, absent extraordinary or 
unusual circumstances." Worrall v. Ogden City Fire Dept, 616 P.2d 598, 601 (Utah 
1980). In further defining the requirements of due process, the Utah Supreme Court has 
stated that "[i]n most instances, the guarantee of due process prohibits the enforcement of 
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a money judgment against a person who has not been designated a party or served with 
process." Brigham Young University v. Tremco, 156 P.3d 782, 789 (Utah 2007). 
Finally, the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1211 
(1983) recognized that: 
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any 
proceeding is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, 
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency 
of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. 
The notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required 
information, and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested to 
make their appearance. Many cases have held that where notice is 
ambiguous or inadequate to inform a party of the nature of the 
proceedings against him or not given sufficiently in advance of the 
proceeding to permit preparation, a party is deprived of due process. 
Under due process considerations, Petitioners complain of three facts which 
deprived them of due process of law when they were denied a hearing before the district 
court. First, the original motion by DABC for order to show cause dated June 18, 2007, 
which was scheduled for hearing on June 29, 2007, did not give Petitioners time to 
address issues related to the compliance bond. Obviously, less than ten days is not 
enough time to contact an out of State bonding company. Such fact was made evident by 
the letter from the bonding company to the State of Utah dated after the hearing, 
indicating they had concluded their review of coverage issues. Petitioners should have 
been granted time to obtain a copy of the bond terms prior to any determination on 
forfeiture. As stated above, due process requires notice to interested parties and adequate 
time to prepare. 
The second concern raised by Petitioners in this appeal is that there was no notice 
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of intent to attach the compliance bond given to the financially responsible party, namely, 
Thomas Sarafolean. As the terms of the compliance bond indicate, Thomas Sarafolean 
is the financially responsible for the compliance bond. This is relevant to this appeal 
because the compliance bond posted on behalf of the entity "rugby pub" was attached by 
the DABC to pay for the violation of Jerald Sarafolean, as an employee and individual. 
Clearly, Thomas Sarafolean should have been afforded the opportunity to object to the 
payment of Jerald Sarafolean's fine and the Rugby Pub should have been given the 
chance to address coverage issues of employees under the terms of the bond. 
(emphasis added). The complete lack of respect for due process was compounded after 
the district court held there would be no trial de novo, thereby leaving Petitioners with 
zero opportunity to address coverage issues and the rights and obligations of third parties 
under the bond. Had the appeal for trial de novo been accepted, all issues regarding third 
party liability, bond coverage, and fine schedules could have been adequately addressed. 
Failure to allow such appeal was an abrogation of due process of law based on notice and 
opportunity to prepare. 
Finally, Petitioners complain that there is a conflict of interest in the DABC 
Commission making a decision regarding Petitioners' request for a continuance and on 
their order revoking the bond. Conflict is rife where a commission created by the same 
agency seeking enforcement has final decision making power. The Utah Supreme Court 
has stated that "[o]ne of the fundamental principles of due process is that all parties to a 
case are entitled to an unbiased, impartial judge." Anderson v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 
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696 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1995). Under the facts of this case, there is the undeniable 
and essential need for an unbiased third party to make a decision in this case. Quite 
plainly, administrative remedies are inadequate and denial of Petitioners' right to appeal 
the matter to the district court deprived them of their due process. For these reasons and 
those set forth above, it is abundantly clear that this case should be remanded for 
consideration of the appeal for trial de novo. 
CONCLUSION 
In accordance with Utah law, the district court did have jurisdiction over the 
appeal of the June 29, 2007 order issued by the DABC. In addition to a wrongful 
application of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Petitioners' rights under the Utah 
open courts provision of the Utah Constitution and the due process clause of the United 
States and Utah Constitutions were violated when their appeal requesting judicial review 
of agency action was dismissed without a hearing. For the reasons set forth herein, 
Petitioners urge this Court to remand this case for further judicial determination of the 
rights duties and obligations of the parties. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this l*f day of MJ^^OH , 2008. 
DOUGLAS A. GUBLER, #7212 
Attorney for Petitioners 
4659 S. Highland Dr. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: (801) 274-2333 
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1 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - OCTOBER 29, 2007 
2 HONORABLE GLENN K. IWASAKI, JUDGE PRESIDING 
3 P R O C E E D I N G S 
4 THE COURT: - of the Department of Alcohol Beverage 
5 Control, 070910861. Appearances please? 
6 MR. GUBLER: Doug Gubler on behalf of petitioners, 
7 Rugby Pub and Gerald Sarafolean. 
8 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Gubler. 
9 MS. PAGE: Sheila Page, Assistant Attorney General, 
10 for the Department of Alcohol and Beverage Control. 
11 THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Page. An attorney 
12 without their file is like one without their pen. 
13 MS. PAGE: Well, -
14 THE COURT: Do you want us to wait? 
15 MS. PAGE: Actually, I do have some - my argument 
16 wasn't prepared here. 
17 THE COURT: All right. 
18 MS. PAGE: I think we can go ahead. 
19 THE COURT: Okay, very well. Thank you, Ms. Page. 
20 This is before the Court on respondent's Motion to 
21 Dismiss. The Court is appreciative and acknowledges the 
22 courtesy copies that have been provided to the Court. 
23 They're always helpful to me. Rest assured that those 
24 matters which have been briefed, which have not been argued, 
25 will be considered by the Court. I think the Court has the 
arguments in mind. 
This is your motion, Ms, Page. You have the 
record. 
MS. PAGE: Thank you. 
THE COURT: You are stating a procedural defect, 
and, therefore, there's no jurisdiction to - for the Court to 
hold this matter. Is that one of your points? 
MS. PAGE: That's correct, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Can you expand on that? 
MS. PAGE: Yes. The - I think the primary issues 
center around whether or not the order of April 27th was a 
final order or not. I don't think that this Court would 
consider any of its orders - making judgment to be anything 
less than a final order and expect that it would be complied 
with. The Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control - in 
particular, the commission issued an order and - which it 
expected a licensee to follow. That order went unchallenged 
by the respondents in the case below, and - but they also 
failed to pay the fines and the costs that were ordered by 
the commission. At such time, the department took action to 
recoup those costs and also to get the fine. 
The April 27th order complies in every way with the 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act. In particular, this -
the provisions that an order be final before it be judicially 
challenged, and that a respondent be given the opportunity to 
1 know that they have a right to either seek administrative 
2 review before the agency, or - and/or judicial review, and 
3 those things are contained in that order. That order stands. 
4 It was never challenged in a timely fashion, and we believe 
5 that their - it did constitute the final order of the 
6 department on the disciplinary actions that were adjudicated 
7 before a hearing officer finding fault with both Rugby Pub 
8 and Gerald Sarafolean, the owner and an employee. 
9 When the advisor got paid, the costs were not paid. 
10 The department took action on the bond. And in this case, I 
11 think it's important for you to look at the actual terms of 
12 the bond. The bond are such that they ran specifically to 
13 the department. If the licensee failed to comply with not 
14 only the laws, and the statutes, and the rules, but also the 
15 orders of the commission. 
16 THE COURT: Okay. 
17 MS. PAGE: And based on that, the department did 
18 make claim on the bond, gave notice to the defendant that 
19 they were going to seek forfeiture through the bonding 
20 company, and an order to show case was held pursuant to the 
21 rules of the department. 
22 THE COURT: And that is the basis for petitioner's 
23 motion for partial summary judgment, and I'm glad that you 
24 brought that up, cause I want your best argument as to 
25 opposition of that too, and I'm - and you're getting to it, I 
know. But as to these arguments, I want your best argument 
in support of your positions and opposition to the opposing 
side, and that'll be your argument. So as much as you want 
to argue your motion in support or your opposition of a 
partial summary judgment, now's your time. 
MS. PAGE: Thank you. 
The Administrative Procedures Act doesn't address 
in specificity what happens if an order of a administrative 
agency is not followed. Subsection 46(b) (19) only provides 
that you can go to the district court. It does not cut off 
any avenues short of going to the district court to get your 
orders complied with. The department requires bonds of its 
licensees to make sure that any outstanding fines, fees, etc. 
are covered by the department, so that the department's not 
left holding the bag. 
In this particular instance, the - as I said, the 
outcome is a beer bond, which was filed by the licensee in 
this matter. It granted specifically to violations of the 
law. 
THE COURT: And your position is that by terms of 
conditions of the bond, itself it is explicit in that it is 
for the payment of fines, or fees, or costs that are 
associated with noncompliance of commission orders? 
MS. PAGE: Yes. 
THE COURT: And contrasted by Mr. Gubler's position 
1 that there need to be a revocation first before you can work 
2 on - before you can look to the bond for remedies? 
3 MS. PAGE: And in this particular - there are bonds 
4 out there that do not state exactly what this bond said is my 
5 understanding. 
6 THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
7 MS. PAGE: And the statute does deal about - deal 
8 specifically in terms of revocations and bonds. 
9 THE COURT: And that's 81-1-6? 
10 MS. PAGE: Right. 
11 THE COURT: Okay. 
12 MS. PAGE: Well, and not just 81-1-6, but the bonds 
13 - each section of the - each Alcoholic Beverage Control Act 
14 deals with specific licensees, and they each require a bond, 
15 and the bonds are somewhat addressed in there. 
16 THE COURT: Okay. 
17 MS. PAGE: If I could direct your attention to 32A-
18 10-205 -
19 THE COURT: 32? 
20 MS. PAGE: A-10-205. 
21 THE COURT: Thank you. 
22 MS. PAGE: And it requires a bond and sets the 
23 amount of the bond at $2,000, and talks about what happens if 
24 it's negligent, and whether there has to be faithful 
25 compliance of the type of the rules of the commission. And 
it also provides that if there is a revocation, the bond may 
be forfeited. I don't think that that is limiting to the 
department that only in the terms of revocation of license 
could you forfeit the bond because if there's revocation of 
license, there's generally no other penalty which would 
require access to that bond. There are not usually fines. 
There may be costs, but not usually fines. 
THE COURT: In your reply brief - and correct me if 
I'm wrong, and I know that you will - didn't you mention the 
fact that while we haven't yet revoked, which you have to 
concede. 
MS. PAGE: Right. 
THE COURT: That that's just an almost pro forma 
under the circumstances? 
MS. PAGE: Well, and in the facts of this 
particular case, you've got both issues. You've got a bond, 
which clearly runs to the benefit of the department if 
there's violations of the commission's orders, and you also 
have the fact that revocation, given the facts of this 
particular case are - would, in fact, be pro forma, because 
the have chosen to go out of business. 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MS. PAGE: And so you have taking actions of both -
to either suspend or revoke the license would be an exercise 
in not necessarily futility, because I think they have a 
1 legal consequence to them, but that consequence is more grave 
2 to the licensee than it is to the harm of the public. 
3 THE COURT: And choosing to go out of business, 
4 they - does that mean that their license is revoked? Don't 
5 they have their license even though they're in or out of 
6 business to be renewed or something like that -
7 MS. PAGE: Correct. 
8 THE COURT: - rather than a revocation? So isn't 
9 it necessary to have a process specifically for revocation, 
10 rather than to rely upon the fact that they've closed their 
11 doors. 
12 MS. PAGE: Well, in this case, they were so far 
13 passed the renewal period, that they would have to reapply 
14 for new licensure. 
15 I THE COURT: Okay. 
16 MS. PAGE: So the revocation at this point in time 
17 would simply keep Mr. Sarafolean from applying for a license 
18 for 36 months. And given the nature of the violation -
19 THE COURT: And the fact that it's lapsed, can he 
20 reapply at any time without that burden of revocation? 
21 MS. PAGE: Yes, he can. 
22 THE COURT: Okay. 
23 MS. PAGE: So we have, in fact, a case here where 
24 not only have - I think Mr. Sarafolean benefitted from the 
25 fact that revocation was not sought in this matter, but you 
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have a bonding company, which investigated the matter, found 
the department's actions to comply with the terms of the 
bond, and have paid on it. 
Most recently, - well, rather than to get into that 
issue, I want to address the fact that, again, the commission 
must have a method to enforce its own actions, and the 
judgment was no less final at that point in time than it 
would be if it came from this very court. The fact that 
people do not comply with the court's orders, only give rise 
to later proceedings, which are inherent in the powers of the 
court, and inherent in the powers of the commission to make 
sure that all orders are - if we come to this court, and I 
have in another matter gone to the district court and 
requested compliance, that the court require that the 
licensee comply with the orders, but they were not monetary 
orders. They were other orders that affected public issues, 
and would be more appropriate to the powers of this Court in 
enforcing of the administrative orders of the Alcoholic 
Beverage Control Commission. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MS. PAGE: Now, as to the issue of petitioner's 
motion for partial summary judgment, the facts are not -
there's no line of dispute about the facts. What the law is 
that effects those facts is - and whether they have any legal 
ramifications. Mr. Gubler in his - both his pleadings and in 
1 his - and in our conversations have indicated they felt they 
2 were treated badly the first time through, and they're upset 
3 about the April 27th order. That issue has got to be 
4 considered, you know, permanent and dead and buried. 
5 The secondary issue is what effect the commission's 
6 later order to enforce its own earlier order would have, and 
7 I don't think that there are - there's a lot of dispute in 
8 the facts. Again, is he entitled to partial summary 
9 judgment? I don't believe he is because I don't think this 
10 Court has jurisdiction. But the best argument I think that 
11 can be made is that Mr. Sarafolean has gone to great lengths 
12 to avoid paying a debt that he owed, and it would not be 
13 incumbent upon this Court to try and enforce that. 
14 Also, Mr. Gubler has brought up in his reply memo 
15 that I received last week an indication that he feels that 
16 there are necessary parties that haven't been brought into 
17 this proceeding, and I don't know who those parties are. He 
18 moves to them, but he doesn't say who those parties could 
19 possibly be. If they are, in fact, the bonding company, then 
20 his remedy does lie in contract. It doesn't lie in judicial 
21 review of the administrative order, and that's the route that 
22 he should have followed with his client's legal interests 
23 rather than coming before this Court for judicial review. 
24 THE COURT: Let me restate my understanding of your 
25 positions. You first position is those should be dismissed 
1 for lack of jurisdiction because there was a question as to 
2 the final order in this matter and the application of that. 
3 If I deny that and say I do have jurisdiction, then your 
4 other position is, by virtue of the language of the bond, 
5 itself, there is need - no need to take the position that he 
6 is taking - that Mr. Gubler has taken on behalf of 
7 petitioner, because there's no need for a revocation prior to 
8 looking toward the bond for a satisfaction, because the 
9 language in, itself, of the bond is for - to make payments 
10 for fines, and costs, and fees pursuant to failure to comply 
11 with commission orders. 
12 MS. PAGE: Yes. 
13 THE COURT: And then finally at the very end, you 
14 are - your position is even if you deny my motions, you 
15 cannot grant their motions for partial summary judgment 
16 because of the conflicting statutory - or conflicting rules 
17 that may be applicable to the assessment of costs or fees. 
18 MS. PAGE: Yes. 
19 THE COURT: Have I stated your position correctly? 
20 MS. PAGE: You have, Your Honor. I think you 
21 understand it well. 
22 THE COURT: Thank you very much, Ms. Page. 
23 Mr. Gubler? 
24 MR. GUBLER: Your Honor, I find it interesting that 
25 J Ms. Page eludes to the fact that the ability to attach this 
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1 bond is contractual in nature based on the fact that they 
2 filed an order to show cause in order to have it determined 
3 by the commission whether it was appropriate to attach that 
4 bond. We didn't have an argument, although - or we didn't 
5 present an argument for appeal based on the April order. 
6 That was in part due to finances and the fact that my client, 
7 Mr. Sarafolean, who she claims has gone to great lengths to 
8 avoid paying the fine, was fined $50. I think over the fine 
9 schedule, which is set - the penalty schedule which is set 
10 forth in Rule 81 that for a first occurrence involving a 
11 minor violation, there is no fine whatsoever which they state 
12 is applicable to a first violation. Nonetheless, outside 
13 their own rules promulgated, they fined my client. We were 
14 willing to accept that based on finances, because the cost of 
15 an appeal would exceed the fine that was assessed to my 
16 client and was not in accordance with the rules promulgated 
17 by the commission. So that was our first contention when we 
18 let that go. 
19 Our next contention was that after they had 
20 assessed exorbitant fines and fees outside the rules to my 
21 client, they went ahead and sent out a notice on an order to 
22 show cause to attach the bond, and that bond was signed for 
23 by a separate individual, not Gerry Sarafolean. It was 
24 signed for, and his obligation to pay was contractual to 
25 Thomas Sarafolean, Mr. Gerry Sarafolean's brother. So the 
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fact -
THE COURT: So is there a third party beneficiary 
somewhere around here that is not Rugby Pub or Sara - or your 
client. I mean -
MR. GUBLER: Well, there's 
THE COURT: - the bond is posted for a reason to 
cover somebody. Are you saying it doesn't cover any of the 
people? 
MR. GUBLER: It was suppose to cover the Rugby Pub. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. GUBLER: And so not to cover Gerry Sarafolean, 
who was an employee of the Rugby Pub. What the commission 
did was they gathered all the fines that had been assessed of 
the Rugby Pub and the employee for his actions. And they 
said the Rugby Pub's bond is going to pay for all of those, 
including the individuals, who was Gerry Sarafolean. And so 
what they did, is they lumped that together. And they say, 
we're going to take the whole bond to pay for Mr. 
Sarafolean's breach of his duty to wear a badge - or the 
allegations, which incidentally, are outside the rules that 
they promulgated themselves to even assess him a fine at all 
- and we're going to attach that bond, and we're going to 
make the signer of that bond financially responsible for it, 
and that is Thomas Sarafolean. 
Now, I find it interesting that they would do that, 
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1 because they started sending letters out to the bond company 
2 and to the person responsible who had signed on the bond in 
3 June, in the middle part of June. And they sent a letter out 
4 on June 8th to Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland saying 
5 that they were going to attach the bond. 
6 My client - well, Thomas Sarafolean didn't get 
7 notice of that until much later. But once he got notice that 
8 he was going to be financially responsible for not only the 
9 actions of Rugby Pub but for Gerald Sarafolean, he said, hey, 
10 I've got a right to be heard on this. This is my property. 
11 Due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard. 
12 Therefore, I was contacted. 
13 On June 20th, I sent a letter out to the bond 
14 company. And I said, first of all, let me have a copy of the 
15 bond so I know what contractually Thomas Sarafolean is 
16 obligated to pay. At that same time on June 20th, leaving me 
17 very little time to be able to receive any documents from the 
18 bonding company, I asked for a continuance of - on the order 
19 to show cause which was denied. I could provide the Court a 
20 copy of my letter to the bonding company, but it wasn't until 
21 after the hearing - well, after the hearing that I was given 
22 a copy of the contract on the bond to be able to determine 
23 whether Mr. Thomas Sarafolean had any objections, and whether 
24 contractually he is the signer that was obligated to pay for 
25 [ the actions of Gerry Sarafolean, the employee. 
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And this is precisely why I think the legislature 
has enacted this is that it needs to be a final agency 
action. In this particular case, it was not final. And the 
reason that I deem it not to be final, and my clients will 
argue the same, is the fact that it involved a third party 
who had signed on the bond and not been given notice at the 
other hearings that he was going to have to cough up some 
money in order to pay for the fines that had been assessed. 
And so from there, we filed the appeal. And I think that 
it's clear based on the fact that the agency issued an order, 
which was the order saying, yeah, you can go ahead and revoke 
the bond, and that was the final order issued by the division 
on June 29th of 2007. I can provide a copy of that to you if 
you'd like. 
THE COURT: Sure. Thank you, Mr. Gubler. 
MR. GUBLER: And I think as I read the statute and 
the case law, the case law in Barker provides that final 
agency action has not been divided per statute, and so 
they've gone on and that - and the Railroad case to define 
what is final agency action, and they've pointed out the 
test. They've enunciated it. In fact, as - I'll direct the 
Court, Barker v. Utah Public Services Commission. The 
Supreme Court recognized and stated that the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act does not specifically define 
final agency action. However, it does say that an agency 
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1 will contemplate in reconsideration of an order only if the 
2 order would otherwise constitute a final agency action. So I 
3 think what they're - they were stating in the Barker case is 
4 you can't prematurely appeal the case to the district court 
5 unless all proceedings have been finalized. We don't want 
6 you jumping the gun, even if you feel like your rights are 
7 being taken advantage of by administrative agency. 
8 They were wrong to state that the model state 
9 Administrative Procedure Act defines agency action negatively 
10 as the whole or a part of any action which is not 
11 preliminary, preparatory procedural, or intermediate with 
12 regard to a subsequent agency action of that agency or 
13 another. 
14 This - the one - the action taken on April 27th was 
15 clearly intermediary, because they sought an order to show 
16 cause saying, hey, do we have grounds to take this bond? 
17 They weren't sure, and so they filed an order to show cause, 
18 and the sole purpose of the order to show cause was to 
19 determine whether it was appropriate to attach the bond. 
20 At that point, that triggered a series of events 
21 notifying the bonding company, who in turn notified Thomas 
22 Sarafolean of the fact that he was going to have to cough up 
23 some money. And based on that, my client said, well, that's 
24 not appropriate. We're - we've had enough. First of all, 
25 they fined us where under their own rules, there's no 
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provision for a fine, but it was a minor fine. It was 50 
bucks, even though they assessed a bunch of costs that were 
exorbitant, my client right now, cause the order just said, 
well, I guess I'll just have to eat the fine. But after they 
lumped that fine together with the fine of the Rugby Pub and 
told another individual that he was going to have to pay both 
the individual fine assessed to an individual and the Rugby 
Pub, he said, "I've had enough. That's not my obligation, 
and I have the right to appeal that", which we did. 
And I think that the standard which is set out in 
Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Utah State Tax Commission is 
appropriate. They state the appropriate test to determine 
whether an agency action is final under Utah law becomes 
three parts. Number one, has the administrative decision 
making reached a stage where judicial review will not disrupt 
the orderly process of adjudication? So we've got to wait 
til they've issued findings of fact, and an order, and some 
other things to determine whether it's appropriate to take 
that on appeal, which clearly we did in this case. 
Number two, have the rights or obligations been 
determined, or will legal consequences flow from the agency 
action? And so in this case, we're saying the rights and 
obligations have not been determined on the April 27th order. 
There was one more order that needed to be determined to find 
out what obligations and duties would be imposed on a third 
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1 party. That required another hearing, which they had which I 
2 came to, and I objected to. I read the rule to the 
3 commission. I stated our grounds for not wanting that bond 
4 revoked, and clearly stated that due process requires more or 
5 less an opportunity to be heard. Which incidentally, if you 
6 go to the letter that was sent out by the commission, they 
7 were sent out to Thomas Sarafolean on June 11th. The hearing 
8 was set for the - I believe the 19th - 18th. So on June 11th, 
9 Thomas Sarafolean was going to be responsible for the payment 
10 on the bond, and he gets a letter stating that, hey, we've 
11 decided to attach the bond for payment of $1,168. You've got 
12 the right to be heard on that. He's got less than seven days 
13 to run and get a copy of the bond from the bonding company, 
14 and appear at the hearing, and make any objections he has to 
15 that. So I got called. I asked for a continuance, which 
16 they said no way, which either violated due process in and of 
17 itself. It's another example, I think, of the commission 
18 just following any kind of rules they want. They file their 
19 own - they have a violation schedule they don't follow, and 
20 then they send out notices to attach a bond without giving a 
21 person the appropriate - any amount of time to object to it. 
22 And when we ask for a continuance they say denied. I can 
23 provide lists from - and I wrote a letter to the bonding 
24 company on the 20th. And so our position is, that the April 
25 27th order was not final. In fact, in their response 
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1 memorandum, they admit that it was transitory, that it was an 
2 order issued in transition to a determination as to whether 
3 the bond could be attached, and we have great problems with 
4 the bond. First of all, under the Utah Code, the legislative 
5 grant of authority, the only provision in there which talks 
6 about attachment of a bond states that if a permit or license 
7 is revoked, a condition precedent, if - then why occurred. 
8 They have to ask them why it occurs. In other words, the 
9 legislatures is saying, only in grave cases if we're going 
10 after your license, can we revoke the bond. And the 
11 commission made order the revocation of any compliance bond 
12 posted by the committee or licensee. Now, -
13 THE COURT: Now, who is the - what is the fact, if 
14 it is a fact, that your client has shut the doors. They have 
15 waived - they have - Ms. Page has indicated there has been -
16 I time has passed for them to renew it, and so they would have 
17 to make a re-application - in effect, a revocation in and of 
18 itself. What effect, if any, in your opinion do those facts 
19 have - or those representations have? 
20 MR. GUBLER: Well, the fact of the matter is, they 
21 never - in fact, within their penalty range for a mild -
22 minor and moderate violation, it doesn't provide for 
23 attachment of a bond or even license revocation. That's not 
24 an option for the penalties that were alleged against the 
25 Rugby Pub and the individual, Gerry Sarafolean. 
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THE COURT: All right. 
MR. GUBLER: So first of all, in our opinion under 
the legislative mantle of authority, which I think rules over 
the administrative rules which were promulgated by the 
Division of Alcohol and Beverage Control, it states, number 
one, that if you go after the license, then you can attach 
the bond. And we're saying that, yes, it does have an impact 
on that fact that we closed - that the Rugby Pub closed its 
doors because they're saying we don't have any more money, 
and we're going out of business, and we can't pay our bills. 
And so I think that it - it has an impact in that it clearly 
demonstrated that there was someone that was saying, hey, 
look, financially, I've had enough. I can't pay anymore. 
And so the fact that they come after - they voluntarily 
relinquished the license and say, you know what? We're going 
to take the bond. I think is unfair to the person who signed 
on the bond. 
THE COURT: So your position is similar to what Ms. 
Page may have mentioned in argument, that if there's a bond 
revocation, that's usually the end of the story? 
MR. GUBLER: Yeah - but well, I don't know, because 
sometimes the bond revocation is temporary. It's for 15 
days, and then there's some provisions in the code which 
state that, you know, they can - or the license, not the 
bond. Excuse me. That sometimes the license revocation is 
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1 temporary. So if they say, we're going to go after your 
2 license which allows us to go after your bond, then we put 
3 you out of business for a few days. Make you think about it. 
4 It's a penalty that's going to protect the public. Well, I 
5 don't see - my clients have voluntarily said, we're not going 
6 to renew our license, which is a protection to the public. 
7 There's no fear that they're going to re - be a repeat 
8 offense of that. 
9 THE COURT: So your representation is, they have 
10 voluntarily relinquished everything by virtue of -
11 MR. GUBLER: Well, they -
12 THE COURT: - shutting down and not asking for a 
13 renewal? 
14 MR. GUBLER: They just said, what, we're not going 
15 to renew it. 
16 THE COURT: Okay. 
17 MR. GUBLER: But our biggest problem is, the only 
18 authority that they elude to which would give them the 
19 ability to attach that bond legally under the statute would 
20 be under their rules, which were promulgated by the 
21 commission, which is Rule 81-1-6, but that even talks about 
22 the fact that they've got to go after the bond. It says 
23 under (e) it says, "Failure of the licensee or permitee to 
24 pay a fine or administrative costs within 30 days of the 
25 initial date established by the commission shall result in 
20 
1 issuance of an order to show cause. Right of the license or 
2 permit should not be revoked, and the licensee's or 
3 permittee's compliance bond forfeited." So even in that, 
4 after the legislature has stated that there was a condition 
5 precedent for going after the bond, which is you've got to go 
6 after the license. It's got to be serious enough to go after 
7 the license. 
8 Then they promulgate their own rules which say, you 
9 know, number one, you've got to go - your license or permit 
10 can be revoked, and then we can attach your bond. Never -
11 this is the main point also is never did they say we're going 
12 after your license or permit, and that predates the time when 
13 they voluntarily relinquished it. They never said we're 
14 going to go after your bond, and they never said we're going 
15 to go after your license. And so Tommy Sarafolean never said 
16 I'm going to be financially on the hook for the acts of Gerry 
17 Sarafolean, and that's our forum. I think that due process 
18 requires notice to all interested parties. Revocation of the 
19 bond triggered notice to a party, but he really didn't have 
20 an opportunity to be heard. And at that point he said, I 
21 want to appeal it. I don't like it. In fact, the fine 
22 assessed was outside their own agency rules, and we object to 
23 it vehemently because they're going - they're treating us 
24 unfairly, and then they're assessing a whole bunch of 
25 administrative costs to us. 
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1 So that's our position. We think that they admit 
2 that it was a transitory order, April 27th. They state 
3 theirselves, that was only something preparatory to revoking 
4 the bond, and that's exactly what the Barker case state and 
5 the Union Pacific case states and, therefore, under the clear 
6 definition provided by our Supreme Court, we're allowed to 
7 take an appeal - 30 days. 
8 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Gubler. 
9 Contrary to my initial remarks, I'm going to allow 
10 both sides, if they wish to, a brief rebuttal if you want to 
11 finish it. 
12 MS. PAGE: Thank you, Your Honor. I do have 
13 several things I'd like to address. 
14 THE COURT: Very well. 
15 MS. PAGE: First of all, this is the first time 
16 I've heard the name Thomas Sarafolean in this case. Mr. 
17 Gubler did not appear before the commissioner to indicate 
18 that he was representing Mr. Thomas Sarafolean, but Gerald 
19 Sarafolean and Rugby Pub. He has not entered an appearance 
20 on behalf of Gerald - of Thomas Sarafolean. His name isn't 
21 appearing in any of the pleadings, and I did a registered 
22 principal search on Rugby Pub. Thomas Sarafolean has no 
23 relationship to this company that we can tell. Gerald 
24 Sarafolean is the principal and the registered agent. Mr. 
25 Gerald Sarafolean is the only one who's every appeared on 
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behalf of Rugby Pub. The fact that Mr. Thomas Sarafolean may 
have signed on the bond is totally irrelevant to the - I 
think these proceedings. It's no different than if you walk 
in and pay a cash bond for your son. The bond is still for 
the benefit of that person. The beneficiary in this case is 
Gerald Sarafolean and his business, Rugby Pub. 
The - in no shape or form, I think, did I ever 
refer to the order to show cause as a transitory position. I 
think what I did say, and if not, clearly I would state it 
here for Your Honor is that it didn't trigger a new 
proceeding, a new adjudicated proceeding at the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act. It was an order in 
furtherance of the earlier case, which should have been over 
and done with by the payment of the fines and costs as were 
ordered by the department. 
Again, I don't think Mr. Gubler on behalf of either 
of Mr. Sarafolean can - to - can challenge that April 27th 
order. It was final. I can refer you to the last page of 
the order. "Respondents have the right to seek judicial 
review of this order within 30 days from the date of order in 
the district court in accordance with Utah Code Annotated, 
§63-46(b) 14, 15, and 17, and 18, and 32(a) 1, 119, and 120," 
and I can tell you that those are the judicial review 
sections of both UAPA and the admini - and the Alcoholic 
Beverage Control Act. In every way, shape, or form, this was 
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1 a final order. 
2 Now, the other issue would be - excuse me. I've 
3 lost my train of thought. Oh, the fines were due well in 
4 advance of June. They were due in May, and, of course, the 
5 department, once those fines were past due, started looking 
6 at how they were going to get the matter paid. I have to say 
7 that I think they've taken great effort in trying to work 
8 with the respondents in getting them to pay what is due from 
9 them and to give everyone adequate notice because quite 
10 honestly, they don't have to revoke very many bonds. Most 
11 people will pay them or they will voluntarily surrender the 
12 bond and indicate we don't have the cash to do that. The 
13 idea that people are temporarily revoked for a period of time 
14 is new and foreign to me, and I've been representing the 
15 department for three years now. And revocations are 
16 permanent acts, and they do trigger some very onerous, long 
17 term issues to the principals involved. And people defend 
18 their licenses quite vigorously because of the fact that all 
19 of the principals involved, whether it be a small LLC like 
20 this one or a fairly good sized incorporated bodies take care 
21 not to get their licenses revoked if they can possibly help 
22 it, because they can't - no one can reapply for a three year 
23 period of time. And if that's your livelihood, you look to 
24 that as being something you want to protect and take issue 
25 with if you feel that you've been wronged. Your Honor, -
24 
THE COURT: Defending -
MS. PAGE: - I don't think that Mr. Thomas 
Sarafolean is a party to these proceedings, and he certainly 
could have been made a party. Mr. Gubler knew about his 
existence. I don't think the rest of us knew that he had 
this interest in this proceeding, and -
THE COURT: With that said about the - now, I've 
lost my train - but the point before you just closed. 
MS. PAGE: About Mr. Sarafolean? 
THE COURT: No, before that. Oh, what does the 
representation by Mr. Gubler now that his client has 
voluntarily relinquished his license? What does that - does 
that have any affect on you at all, and how do you respond to 
that? 
MS. PAGE: Well, the fact that he's surrendered his 
license - the department - it - the practical affect on the 
public is nil.- I mean, there's a business that had a license 
that no longer has a license. 
THE COURT: Yeah, but... 
MS. PAGE: The Division gets to decide whether or 
not they will accept or - as a voluntary surrender. Because 
quite honestly, I have cases where - the revocations are 
pending, and the people want to just surrender their license 
to get out from underneath it. That three year, you know, 
issue that can cause them problems with future licenses or 
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1 other licenses that they may hold, but the fact that he's out 
2 of the business doesn't terminate the jurisdiction of both 
3 the agency and the court. Practically, he is out of 
4 business, and if leaves the business and he has debts owing, 
5 then he has a bond that will do for people to a particular 
6 payment. 
7 But the fact of the matter is, is that Gerry 
8 Sarafolean is Rugby Pub. He was an employee, but he's also 
9 the owner. And we insist that people give us a name and a 
10 person that you can contact because you have to be able to 
11 work with an individual, and Mr. Sara - Gerry Sarafolean is 
12 the person who is and was Rugby Pub. 
13 THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Page. 
14 Mr. Gubler? 
15 MR. GUBLER: Well, Your Honor, I think Ms. Page 
16 clearly and simply misrepresents the facts. June 11th, 
17 there's a letter from Zurich, who's the bonding company to 
18 Thomas Sarafolean saying, Mr. Sarafolean, the surety below 
19 issue alcohol liquor tax bond in behalf of Rugby Pub here and 
20 receipt of the enclose correspondence received from the State 
21 of Utah making demand under the terms of the bond for the 
22 payment of $1,168.33. First time Mr. Thomas Sarafolean's 
23 been given notice that he's going to have to pay some money 
24 right here -
25 THE COURT: And that's who? The bonding company 
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1 that he purchased the bond from? 
2 MR. GUBLER: Yeah. Yeah, yep. He said, you know, 
3 the bonding company was notified on June - I think June 9th 
4 or June 10th. The letter was sent out from DABC saying we're 
5 going to attach the bond. I think the fact that I've gone 
6 through the papers and the on-premise beer bond was issued in 
7 the name of Thomas Sarafolean, which is - his name appears 
8 there on the application and also appears on the Utah 
9 Department of Alcohol and Beverage Control application for 
10 non-tavern, on-premise beer license. And so I think clearly, 
11 Thomas Sarafolean was due some notice on these proceedings, 
12 and Ms. Page is just barely admitted that at no point in time 
13 was Thomas Sarafolean notified, joined in the action, or 
14 given any chance to respond, period. 
15 THE COURT: Well, not from the department, because 
16 there is no - I can see what the bonding company would give 
17 Thomas Sarafolean notice, because he apparently, contracted 
18 with the bonding company, but unless and until there was some 
19 notice to the Department that Thomas Sarafolean was involved 
20 in this matter rather than Gerald Sarafolean, why should they 
21 send out notice to a Thomas Sarafolean? 
22 MR. GUBLER: What more do they need? The 
23 application was signed by Thomas J. Sarafolean. What - who -
24 I mean, do they need to send someone down to say, look, 
25 Thomas needs to be notified when the Utah Department -
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on-premise beer bond was issued based on an application? 
Because the application was in the name of Thomas J. 
Sarafolean. The contact person, Gerald Sarafolean, but 
Thomas' address is listed here. The first time he hears from 
them is from the bond company? We're coming after you for 
some money? We never served you with notice of the agency 
action. We never did any of that. So the first time he has 
the right to say, hey, I don't like this is when the bond 
company contacts him on June 11th. And he said, bologna. I 
don't like it. It's not fair. In fact, they've gone outside 
their own penalty schedule, and they've penalized us 
severely. 
THE COURT: Thank you both for a well argued and 
interesting issues. I'll take them under advisement and get 
something shortly. 
MS. PAGE: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you very much. 
MR. GUBLER: Thank you. 
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
-c-
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